Despite the increased presence and importance of political risk in the world economy, this subcategory of country risk has not been well explored in the credit risk literature involving private firms. In this study, we investigate political-and legal country risk determinants of firm default probabilities in 88 countries, using a dynamic logit specification to a new dataset of export credit contracts from Finland. We model default probabilities for private firms in countries with different perceived risk levels and country legal origins. We condition the firm default probabilities on a vector of country specific political-and legal risk variables, including government-and instability risks, the level of democracy as well as legal-and creditor rights. We also control for the usually employed traditional firm specific financial variables for a group of companies from 14 countries, defined as the largest high-risk export countries of Finland. Our preliminary results indicate that information on political instability, especially in the form of external conflict in a host country may constitute a significant predictor for firm default, that may not otherwise be detected with scarcely available, or unreliable accounting information.
Introduction
Analysis of financial statements is the starting point in any classification of companies into healthy and financially distressed (or bankrupt) firms. Among the first known attempts to distinguish companies based on their accounting is Fitzpatrick (1932) , who compared financial ratios between successful industrial enterprises from those that failed, and found that the probability of default was related to the individual characteristics of firms. Since then, a large number of empirical studies has been published and well known applications of credit scoring, e.g. the Altman' s Z-Score model (Altman, 1968) and the Moody' s KMV EDF ™ RiskCalc ™ Model.
These accounting-based models are usually applied when no publicly traded securities are available or when secondary market prices are unreliable. Meanwhile, some of the caveats of the accounting-based models is that they rely on financial statements that capture the past performance of the firm rather than its future performance. As noted by Hol et al. (2002) , it still seems that the extensive research effort on bankruptcy-, and default prediction has failed to produce an agreement on which variables are good predictors and why. This may be partly attributed to the fact that the studies refer to different time periods, countries and industries. Most studies are also claimed to lack a theoretical framework to guide the empirical research effort 1 .
Traditionally, when no market data is available, default probability is estimated from failed and non-failed firms, given historical data using annual financial statements. In this paper, we ask whether there could be other factors to consider, especially in situations when the financial information is scarcely available or unreliable, as might be the case in developing countries.
1 Hol et al. (2002) have recently suggested a capital structure based default theory.
While the financial figures of a company are the basis for evaluating its credit profile, non-financial and environmental characteristics seem necessary to complete the picture. The new approach in this paper is to discuss linkages between firm default probability and political-and legal risk that prevail in the country where the borrowing company operates. To what extent do politically unstable environments constitute a risk for foreign lenders, that might not otherwise be reflected in the financial figures of the borrowing company? The aim of this study is to assess whether political-and commercial factors can be distinguished in the credit risk assessment process.
A novel feature of the present study is the use of export credit guaranteed debt contracts in the attempt to model default probabilities from realized payment interruptions 2 . We empirically explore the relationships between firm default probability and political risk in 88 countries between , and analyse the results by categorising the countries according the legal origin, as defined in earlier studies by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 and Djankov et al. (2003 Djankov et al. ( , 2005 . To control for the effects of firm-specific risk, we have collected firm financial variables for a group of companies in the most active recipient countries of world-wide export credits. The selected countries, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Peru, Poland and Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela, reflect also the largest export streams from
Finland to developing countries in the last two decades.
The Export Credit Market
An export credit is a financing arrangement allows a foreign buyer of exported goods and/or services to defer payment over a period of time, usually until the time after the product has been delivered. Technically, export credit contracts can be viewed as credit default swaps, which are not traded. Within the theoretical framework developed around trade credit, the credit terms extended represent the firm' s response to competing informational problems concerning product quality on the one hand, and buyer creditworthiness on the other. An adverse selection problem stems from the exante asymmetric information between buyers and sellers, while a moral hazard problem arises from the ex-post asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, giving rise to the possibility that clients will not pay when the payment is due 3 .
Export credit agencies have played a critical role during the last decade in international financing, especially for the developing countries. Meanwhile, as illustrated in Figure 2 , the recoveries rose to their highest level in over 20 years, whereas claims paid reached the lowest level over the same period. Overall, the amount of investment that ECAs support globally is growing significantly greater than the total amount of lending from the World Bank, IMF, and all other multilateral institutions combined (see e.g. Boote and Ross, 1998) . Thus, in view of the recent 3 see e.g. Estrin et al. (2000) for a review on trade credit theories.
changes of commercial lending 5 , it is our surprise that little empirical work is done on these financial products. In our view, these products constitute a well-grounded research material for assessing the relationship between the risk of financial assets and the broader macroeconomic and political environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief li terature revi ew on def aul t prob abili ty esti m ati on . In secti on 3, we di scuss the question of the impact of political risk on credit defaults and formulate our main research hypothesis. Section 4 presents our research design and data in more detail. In section 5, we present our results with a short analysis of our target countries. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for further research.
5 With regard to calcluating regulatory capital requirements for credit risk, the " standardized approach" by Basel II proposes to measure credit risk based on external credit assesments provided by rating agencies and export credit agencies.
Default probability estimation
There are two schools of thought in the use of statistical methods to predict firm default. One holds that default is modeled using market information, whereas the other recommends using accounting data. As we are considering private firms with no market data available, we restrict our review on the fundamentals-based models, which can further be divided in models that rely on accounting, systematic market and economic factors, or rating information 6 .
Fundamentals-based estimation with accounting info
Empirical attempts to utilise financial information to predict bankruptcy began with studies by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) . Being a classic among the early studies, Beaver (1966) conducted a comprehensive study using a variety of financial ratios and concluded that the cash flow to debt ratio was the single best predictor of firm default. Beaver' s univariate approach of discriminant analysis led the way to a multivariate analysis by Altman (1968) who adopted a multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) framework in his effort to find a bankruptcy prediction model. This became the popular Z-score model, where the financial ratios used are: 1) working capital over total assets; 2) retained earnings over total assets; 3) earnings before interest and taxation over total assets; 4) market value of equity over book value of liabilities; and 5) sales over total assets. In Altman' s study, the Z-Score correctly classified 94% of the bankrupt companies and 97% of the non-bankrupt companies one year prior to bankruptcy. Later, Altman has revised the model for private firms by substituting book value for market value in the calculation of the ratio of market value 6 For a good review of the market-based models, see e.g. Chan-Lau (2006) of equities to the book value of liabilities 7 . The popularity of the Altman Z-score is explained by its parsimony and ease of interpretation.
A l arge n um ber of f i nanci al rati os can b e used as ex pl an atory v ari abl es i n th e accounting based models. Typically, the greatest variations in the probabilities of default come from ratios capturing firms' profitability, growth opportunities, level of indebtness, and liquidity. To obtain a parsimonious model, some selection criteria are needed, and the variables selected are usually those with the higher discriminating power for explaining the default frequency after performing univariate analysis.
However, these steps can only be taken once a robust database has been compiled.
There is usually also the risk of " over-fitting" , that is, the model functions only on the sample data but fails to engage with real-world data that it has not " seen" before.
Once variables have been selected, a variety of statistical techniques have been used to assess the default probability of a firm, including econometric models, linear discriminant analysis, k-nearest neighbor classifier, neural networks, and support vector machine classifier among others (see e.g. Chan-Lau, 2006) . For obvious problems with the assumptions of the initially employed discriminant analysis, discrete dependent variable econometric models (i.e. logit or probit models), have become more popular tools for credit scoring. Ohlson (1980) , and Platt & Platt (1990) present some of the early studies using the logit 8 . Most of the subsequent work in this area has focused on the appropriate statistical methods used to develop the model, finding the variables which best discriminate between the failed and non-failed firms, and demonstrating the performance of the prediction model by examining the percentage of firms predicted correctly.
7 A summary of the methodologies is given in Chuvakhin & Gertmenian (2003) 
Political risk -previous research and hypothesis development
The concept of political risk is generally regarded as rather controversial, because its identity crosses the boundaries of specific social sciences; political science, economics, law and sociology (Simon, 1984) . The field as such attracts a variety of people from different disciplines, ranging from economists, finance professionals, experts in business management and organizational behaviour to political scientists, public policy makers, as well as military and intelligence professionals. Due to this diversity, political risk as a concept has not received a canonical definition and is rather a large, amorphous category. Due to its interdisciplinary nature, political risk analysis bridges various methodologies and approaches and focuses on how political environments of economic action differ from one another between societies, and how those differences can be managed by states and companies (see e.g. Loikas, 2003) .
A historical perspective
As a field of scientific research, the concept of political risk has gone through periods of interesting transformations mainly over the past decades though signs of interest towards political risk in the corporate finance literature existed as early as in the seventieth century (see e.g. Barron and Miranti, 1997 1987 , Balkan 1992 , Edwards 1986 , Brewer and Rivoli 1989 and Peter 2000 and the relationship between democratic institutions and borrowing (see e.g. Schultz and Weingast 2003 and Saiegh 2005) . To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior studies using political risk factors to study corporate credit defaults.
The challenges of the definition
Hill (1998) crystallize the problem of political risk definition and measurement by revisiting the standard finance theory treatment of risk. Already in the classic book by Knight (1921) , risk and uncertainty were distinguished by whether we can make good predictions by extrapolating from sufficiently similar (or homogeneous) past events, or whether the extrapolation is to be made from dissimilar (heterogeneous) events. In the latter case, the quantification is far more difficult depending on the appreciable degree of confidence and precision in the prediction of possible outcomes, payoffs and associated probabilities. The more heterogeneous the events, as is the case with poli tical risk, the less we know about the distributi on of possible outcom es. In addition, as the world changes, the profile of political risk changes and a new event within the class of political risk may revise the definition of political risk itself.
As the diversity of definers, the historical context and the uncertainty involved suggest, there are many different ways of defining political in the economic literature.
In general, the definition depends on the perspective in which one views the political risk and on the importance one attributes to political risk. How broadly the political risk is defined is usually determined by the interests and need of the definer as well as on the type of investment involved. A general definition originally given by Haendel (1979) , appears often in studies of political risk due to its simplicity and flexibility against the interest and need of the definer (e.g. a corporate, a private insurance firm, an export credit agency, a bank or a multinational organization). According to this political risk may be defined as " the probability of the occurrence of some political event that will change the prospects f or the probabili ty of a given investm ent" .
Another definition, given by Caouette, Altman and Narayanan (1998) , that is more suited into the credit risk framework, specifies political risk as " the possibility of delayed, reduced, or non-payment of interest and principal where the outcome is attributable to the country of the borrower" .
For purposes of this study, we define political risk quite broadly, following the guiding principle of these two definitions. Our broad definition will perhaps sacrifice some degree of precision, but as we are studying political risk at the company level and want to distinguish between political (country specific) and financial (firmspecific) risks, we believe this approach is sufficient. The overall risk in this study is viewed from the international creditor' s point of view.
Hypothesis development
The overall hypothesis in the present study is that outcomes from lending decisions to importing and borrowing companies are uncertain not only because of the company as an individual obligor, but also due to surrounding political and legal risk factors, that may have nothing to do with the firm itself. To further elaborate on how political risk affects default probability, some distinctions must be made on how this type of risk may impact a firm' s performance. Wagner (2000) makes the two distinctions in his definition. First, there is a difference between firm-specific political risks and country-specific political risk, sometimes also referred to as " micro" and " macro" risks. Micro, or firm-specific political risks are risks directed at a particular company, and are discriminatory by nature. A firm may be able to reduce both the likelihood and impact of firm-specific risks by incorporating strong arbitration language into a contract or by enhancing on-site security to protect against terrorist attacs. On the other hand, " macro" or country-specific political risks are not directed at a firm but may still affect its performance and firms usually have little control over the impact of country-level political risk on their operations. Examples of such risks may include a government' s decision to forbid currency transfers or the outbreak of a civil war within the host country. A second distinction according to Wagner (2000) is to be made between government and instability risks. The former arise from the actions of a governmental authori ty , whether that authori ty is used legally or not. The l atter emerges from political power struggles. Various examples of political risk from each of these combined fours categories are presented in Table x . The ultimate challenge is to determine whether any particular type of political event poses a threat to a firm' s financial performance.
1) Government and instability risks
First we conjencture that political risk in a country affects the credit risk of firms operating in the country through the above sub-categories of political risk. terrorism. All these situations involve specific risks that might cause a buying firm, that would otherwise be willing to pay the creditor, to be unable to do so.
2) Quality of political institutions
We further analyse the impact of a country' s political system on defaults, describing the quality of a country' s political institutions in terms of the exposure to democracy.
According to the " democratic advantage" argument (see e.g. Shultz and Weingast 1996, 1998) , democracies in general pay lower interest rates for the sovereign debt than authoritarian regimes, because they are better able to make credible commitments. We test for whether this argument is reflected also on the firm level and expect a negative relationship between default probabilities and the level of host country democracy.
3) Legal-and creditor rights
According to previous research there are in general higher volumes of credit good legal environments (e.g. Jappelli et al. 2002) and smaller firms have greater access to formal financing opportunities (Chemin, 2005) . We discuss and test whether legaland financial rights of the creditor and debtor in a country affect default probabilities.
We hypothesise on the one hand, that legal costs may prevent the borrower to incur a " strategic default" , i.e. the case when the firm fails to pay the amount stipulated in the debt contract even though it possesses resources to do so. On the other hand, with costly liquidation, creditors may prefer to forgive part of the debt, which may result in equityholders' incentives to default opportunistically (see e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev, 2003) .
4) Legal origins
Recently, some studies have explored the mechanisms through which legal origin of a country influences financial development (see e.g. Beck and Levine, 2005) . Legal families can be explained by the " political channel" , i.e. differences in giving priority to private property rights of the state could be crucial. For instance, Beck et al. (2003) found that there is less supreme court power in Civil Law than in Common Law countries so the influence by the state is therefore regarded as higher in the Civil Law legal family. One may also argue that legal families respond differently to changing socioeconomic circumstances, and as confirmed by Djankov et al (2005) and that the case law approach by the Common Law is seen as more flexible whereas Civil Law is regarded as inherently more formalistic and rigid. Following previous cross-country evidence, that suggests a link between judicial quality and corporate financing, we extend our study by comparing the results between different legal families following legal origin categorization by Djankov et al. (2003 Djankov et al. ( , 2005 . We expect countries with Civil Law origin (higher state influence) to have larger impact through political risk channels on firm default probabilities.
Research design
We model the default probability for different sets of borrowing firms, using a dynamic binary estimation method where the dependent variable is 1 if the borrowing firm defaults in a specific year and 0 otherwise. The estimated default probabilities are conditioned over a vector of lagged explanatory variables including countryspecific political-and legal risk indicators as well as firm-specific financial ratios.
Our empirical tests are grouped in two parts. In the first part, using a large sample of firm defaults from 88 different countries, we test for how different political-and legal risk indices affect the default probability, and whether one can distinguish any patterns among groups of countries from different legal origins. For the second part,
we have chosen a smaller set of 14 high-risk countries 9 , among which we have systematically collected financial accounting information for the debtor companies. In the second part, we are thus able to test jointly for political and legal risk indices as well as to control for the firm specific financial factors.
Data and sample selection
The credit data is obtained from Finnvera plc, the official Export Credit Agency The register-based data contains detailed information for each guarantee, including the country of origin of the buying firm (i.e. the creditor country); the initiation and ending dates of the underlying loan; type and size of the liability; as well as the details of possible payment interruptions that the creditor may have had with respect to the particular loan concerned.
We divide our research project into two parts depending on the private/public dimension of the data. The private part (the present study at hand) focuses on firms that are outside governmental control. That is, we exclude all guarantees with public bodies or state-owned enterprises as the credit counterparts 10 . This leaves us with data consisting of 26 751 guarantees of which 1 206 (4.5%) have experienced a default.
A detailed description of how the guarantees are spread along the years are reported in Table 2 . Panel A of Table 2 lists newly issued guarantees (and defaults) per year.
Some of the guarantees in the database were initiated before 1980, but were still active and recorded for in the later years. We delimit our study period to the period 1985-2005 and include those guarantees that were active under any year during this 21-year period. This rationale is presented in Panel B of Table 2 , which lists the stock of active guarantees (and defaults) for each year. Throughout the study, we thus consider the stock of guarantees per year and divide this in two groups; those that do not experience a default event (non-default) and those that eventually face financial troubles and are considered as default under the year in consideration. It is possible that guarantees that have experienced a default, may recover (i.e. manage to repay the missed payment), and are again considered as non-default.
The default definition
For modeling purposes and to follow Basel II, we measure the data in firm years and specify the time horizon for the future probability of default as one year which is consistent with the use in the banking practice and prevalent in credit risk models. We use indemnification as our " default indicator" which implies that the creditor has missed a payment of interest or principal, violated against a covenant, attempted to restructure, or made any other declaration of insolvency. Any of these actions that have led the exporter to submit a notice of default for the loan in consideration to Finnvera, and all claims that Finnvera have found to be in order and indemnified, are considered as " defaults" in our study. We know the exact dates for the first and last indemnificatios 11 , if any such had occurred, and consider the loan in a default state between these dates. Table 1 and Figures 1-3. ). For example, in 1996, Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico and Poland were among the top ten countries, that together accounted for 30 11 We do not have information on the dates for the loss claim decision, which would be more appropriate for a more precise default-definition. However, as the data is analyzed in yearly intervals, we believe this approximation is justified.
percent of the industrial country ECAs' contribution (see Table 1 
Measuring political risk
Political risk is measured, using the different categories described in section 3 as references. We include ratings from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 13 to measure government-and instability risks. The impact of the level of democracy is tested using variables from the Polity IV dataset. Legal and creditor rights indices are employed from the World Bank' s Doing Business Database.
1) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
The composite ICRG rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk:
political, financial and economic. Out of these we will employ the political risk rating (hereafter called " the icrg-index"), that contributes 50% of the composite rating and aims at gauging the country' s degree of stability. It is obtained from subjective assessment of ICRG editors that transform qualitative information into numerical scores, through a series of preset questions. The icrg-index is calculated as the sum of 12 social and political qualitative components that are listed and further decomposed in Appendix B. Among the components, for example, the Investment Profile is an indicator of whether a government will take precipitous actions such as expropriation.
Law and Order is seen as an indicator of the stability and transparency of the legal system and an indication of whether contracts might be abrogated. Ethnic tensions are often a preliminary condition to strife that may lead to political violence against investors and creditors, or on their property.
The icrg-index may vary between zero and 100 points, with higher rating indicating for lower risk. As a general guide to grouping countries on the basis of comparable risk, below 50 is considered as very high risk; 50-59.9 is high risk; 60.69.9 is seen as moderate risk; 70-79.9 is low risk; and 80-100 is perceived as very low risk. We expect an inverse relationship between the icrg-index, or any of its subcomponents (if analysed separately) with firm default probabilities.
2) The Polity IV Database 14
The Polity Index from the Polity IV dataset, measures the degree to which a nation is either autocratic or democratic on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). As an complement to measure political stability, we include the Polity IV Regime Durability Variable that measures the years since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions. We expect a lower firm default probability both with the level of host country democracy as well as with the time since last regime change.
14 The Polity database contains information on regime type and political structures of independent states in the world system since 1800. (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2004) .
3) Legal rights and creditor rights
To capture the effects of legal risk, we include two additional indicies from the World Bank' s Doing Business Database. The Legal rights index reflects the legal rights of borrowers and lenders, by measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending. It has a scale from 0 to 10, including 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy and 7 aspects found in collateral law, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The Credit Information Index measures credit information registries; the rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit information available through either public or private bureaus. The index ranges from 0 to 6 featuring the credit information system. Higher values indicate that more credit information is available to facilitate lending decisions. We expect a negative relationship between firm default probability and both the legal rights and credit information, as better laws in place and/or more credit information available should lower the probability of default.
Firm financial variables
What comes to lending to high-risk countries, there is usually a special concern regarding the availability and reliability of the financial information. We choose accounting variables based on how the decision process was initially undertaken, considering the available information when the credit was granted. 
Summary of methodology
The dependent variable y it in our model is the binary discrete variable indicating whether firm i has defaulted or not in year t. The general representation of the model is
where
represents the values of the k explanatory variables of firm i, (or a country specific risk index) one year before the evaluation of the dependent variable.
To examine the likelihood of firm default, we estimate
where p i,t is the probability that firm i will default in period t, conditional on the observed covariates k it X 1 − in the previous period. The functional form selected for this study is a dynamic Logit model. Here, we assume that the variable y it ∈ {0,1} is related to an unobservable index y i * by a linear function of the lagged explanatory variables x i1 , x i2, … . , x ik , and the random term u it such that:
By this structure, we have
with F( ) being the cumulative logistic distribution for u.
Our methodology is an attempt to respond to the concerns of a single-period logit approach 15 , as suggested in Shumway (2001) and Beck et al (1998) . 
Preliminary results

Descriptive statistics -political risk by legal origin
Descriptive statistics -export credit data
With our sample selection criteria, our sample consists of 26 752 guarantees from 88 countries, of which 1 740 guarantees are from the 14 target countries with accounting information. In firm years (defined according to the length of the guarantee existence), these figures amount to 108 444 observations in total of which 3 592 (3.3%) firm years are " default years" . Looking at the target group of our 14 selected countries, total firm year observations are 5 837 of which 286 (4.9%) indicate for default. Table 4 Appendix D), the correlations are somewhat higher, but not substantially, except for icrg and its components, which are naturally not tested jointly.
Results -Part I
We first focus on government risk as predictors of firm default probabilities. Tables 6   to 11 indicate for a significant expected relationship for most legal origin groups. However, combined with other political risk variables, they loose their explanatory power.
Results -Part II
Finally, tables 12 to 14 reports the results for the models, where financial ratios are either tested alone, or combined with selected political-and legal indicators (the icrgindex in Table 13 , and the subcomponents in Table 14 ). Lagged firm financial ratios for the creditor, measuring either Profitability or Leverage are tested both separately as well as jointly as predictors of default probability.
The size variable is positive and significant alone, indicating for that smaller firms may have stronger tendency for debt default. However, this measure is not significant, when other variables are considered. Profitability, measured by net profits to total sales (ebitda) seem to have a significant positive effect (with an extreme coefficient in Model 4) on firm default probability. This may stem from some outliers in the data that should be further explored. However, the sign is correct; the more loss the firm made the more it was likely to default on its debt. Meanwhile, the positive sign for earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization (ebitda) allows oneself to be enticed in speculating on the use of funds by the firms. It seems that these firms were profitable at first, but at the bottom line, unable or unwilling to pay their foreign debts.
The indebtness-ratio (debt), measured by total liabilities to total assets, has the expected positive influence on default probability in all models. Even combined with other financial variables or the icrg-index (or its components), this variable remains significant at 1% level. Similarly, the equity ratio (solv) has the expected sign, and is significant most of the models. However, combined with icrg-risk components in Table 14 , it is no longer significant. The other variables measuring solidity or liquidity are not significant. While the significance of some of the individual coefficients in the models measuring firm performance are indicative, they do not provide evidence concerning the collective group significance of accounting information.
In Table 13 we find that the icrg-index gives the expected sign and is highly significant, when combined with the leverage variables. Same holds for some of the icrg-subcomponents in Table 14 , in particular with the external conflict (extcon) and the investment climate (inv) subcomponents. Combining political risk variables with both profitability and leverage is no longer meaningful, which may be a sign of overfitting. Overall, looking at the p-values for the models, one can conclude that they a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , e x c e p t f o r s o m e o f t h e m o d e l s w h e r e p r o f i t a b i l i t y measures are included. The signs for the other political-and legal indices, when combined with firm financial ratios, are insignificant or sometimes positive, why they can not be interpreted within our stated hypothesis framework.
A note on the sample countries
It is clear that the choice of our 14 sample countries (and the data from only one Export Credit Agency) may reveal some sample selection bias, and the default history may be driven by other external factors. Some of the main events to consider when interpreting the obtained results include, among other things, the following.
The Argentine economic crisis was part of the situation that affected Argentina's whole economy during the late 1990s and early 2000s. While the high level of
Argentinian defaults in our sample in year 2002 seem self-explanatory, the situation is more complicated, as almost all companies operating in the country were affected by the crisis, but due to renegotiations of the debt contracts, many of them " survived" the difficult period. The impact of the IMF bailouts and other forms of debt restructurings should be further analyzed in future versions of this paper.
Indonesia is also a crisis-affected country, mainly by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, which is shown in the default history in our data. However, other patterns of Indonesia may be reflected in our data including the heavy borrowing from official creditors during the 1980s. Overall, trading with and investing in Indonesia has for long been perceived to entail a significant risk of financial loss as the legal system in the country has been regarded very poor. Throughout the post-war history of Indonesia, the military have played a key role in the politics of the country.
Poland experienced a transition from a centrally planned to a market orientated economy, some decade ago. The number of issued guarantees as well as defaults in Poland reflect the general positive developments in the country during the 1990s as well as the fact, that the country had rejoined international capital markets and regained favourable credit ratings, triggering investment inflows.
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates represent an examples of oil-dependent arab
economies, that have strong government controls over major economic activities. The region has been for long the scene of both internal crises and external conflicts. On several occasions, these crises have affected either the flow energy exports or the development of energy production and thus, the export-and import capacity of the country.
Preliminary conclusions
In this study, we have constructed and compared default prediction models for two sets of explanatory variables; traditional accounting ratios, and country-specific political-and legal risk indicators. The models applied in this study were tested using export credit guaranteed debt from 88 countries from different legal origins. This table presents logit regressions for the sample of 88 countries that have effective guarantees and icrg-data available. Robust standards errors are shown in parentheses Note: *** = significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at tht 10% level Table 7 . This table presents logit regressions using the study sample of 14 countries. The dependent variable is the binary indicator of whether the guarantee is considered as default during the year in consideration. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standards errors are shown in parentheses
Logit results for icrg index and the components -English legal origin
Profitability
Indebtness Combined
Note: *** = significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at tht 10% level 
vii)
Military in Politics (6) mil .
viii)
Religious Tensions (6) religion Degree of religious freedom, and the capacity of several religious groups to live in harmony.
ix)
Law and Order (6) law Strenght and and impartiality of the legal system, and the assessment of popular observance of the law.
x).
Ethnic Tensions (6) ethnic The degree of tolerance and compromise between various ethnics.
xi)
Democratic Accountability (6) demac Degree of responsiveness of a government to its people. ICRG differentiates between five types of governance; alternating democracy, dominated democracy, de-facto one-party state, de jure one-party state and autarchy.
xii)
Bureaucracy Quality (4) burq Ability of the local bureaucracy to administrate the country without drastic changes in policy or interruption in government services.
2) Polity IV
Source: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
The POLITY IV project rates the levels of democracy resulting in a "Polity Index", which has scale from -10 to +10 measuring the degree to which a nation is either autocratic or democratic. The Polity IV Regime Durability Variable measures the years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions.
Variable Short name
Polity IV Index polity Polity IV Durable Index durable
3) Legal Rights and Creditor Rights
Source: World Bank / Governance indicators, 2005.
The Legal Rights index, measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. It is based on data collected through study of collateral and insolvency laws, supported by the responses to the survey on secured transactions laws. The index includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy and 7 aspects found in collateral law. The Credit Information Index measures rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information. 
